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Regulatory Capabilities1
A Normative Framework for Assessing the Distributional Effects of Regulation
Fabrizio Cafaggi & Katharina Pistor
Abstract:
This paper develops the normative concept of “regulatory capabilities”, which
asserts that nobody – individuals, groups or entities – should be subjected to a
regulatory regime – public or private, domestic or transnational – without some
freedom to choose. Choice in this context means the ability to accept or reject a
regulatory regime imposed by others or to create an alternative one. A mere
formal option is not sufficient; the freedom to choose requires real alternatives.
The concept of regulatory capabilities has particular traction in the transnational
context where private, hybrid public-private and public actors compete for
influence, shape domestic regulation and in doing so limit the scope for
democratic self-governance. It also helps illuminate the distributional effects of
domestic regulation. As such, “regulatory capabilities” is a contribution to the
general debate on the normative foundation of regulation and governance.
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I. Introduction: The Distributional Effects of Transnational Regulation

Transnational regulation affects individuals, groups and societies around the
world; some is public, but in today’s world much of it is private or hybrid. It can
take different forms, including contracts, certification, safety or quality
standards, as detailed in other contributions to this issue. The term ‘private’
regulation not withstanding, transnational private regulation (TPR) is not always
purely private, but depends in many instances on explicit or implicit delegation of
regulatory powers by states or international organizations to private parties ex
ante, or the validation of private regulatory regimes by legislatures, courts or
public regulators ex post. The purpose of public regulation is to create common
rules that govern a specific issue or domain (food safety, finance, fair trade, etc.)
and command compliance without express consent by those operating in the
relevant domain. A purely private regulation requires consent, at least formally.
Yet, as we will further discuss below, private regimes frequently compel
compliance.
Establishing a regulatory regime entails defining the issues and actors that
shall be regulated, the means and ends of regulation, access to rule making or
amendment processes and sanctions for non-compliance. Every regulatory
regime exerts differential effects on regulators, the direct targets of regulation
(i.e. the regulated), its beneficiaries, as well as others who are indirectly affected
by it. Regulation restricts the choices of some while enabling others to realize
their preferences. As such, every regulatory regime has distributional effects. The
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key question addressed in this paper is what impact the rise of TPR has on the
distributional effects of regulation, especially on the right to choose the rules by
which one is governed.
Any regulatory regime affects the distribution of power and wealth.
Establishing the rules of the game empowers rule makers to influence the
allocation of costs and benefits associated with the regime. In the event that those
framing the regulatory domain also participate in it they can stack the cards so as
to expand their personal gains. The wealth and power effects of regulation are
well established. The literature on regulatory capture, for example, has drawn
attention to the fact that powerful interest groups frequently influence regulators
and benefit from the rents or influence that regulation affords them (Stigler 1971;
Ayres and Braithwaite 1999). There is a well-established literature in sociology on
the power associated with framing issues and debates, largely concerning
domestic issues (Dahl 1957; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 1974), and an
equally vibrant literature on framing power in global affairs (Rosenau 2002;
Grant and Keohane 2005). With the expansion of the regulatory space from
domestic to transnational and global relations, even greater benefits can be
reaped from regulatory framing because of the sheer scale of transnational
regulatory domains and the absence of transnational political institutions to
check regulatory overreach.
We are not the first to note the expansion of transnational regulation, both
public and private. Numerous scholars have analyzed the proliferation of new
actors that wield power in the transnational sphere (Matthews 1997; Slaughter
2004; Grant and Keohane 2005; Cutler 2003) and the emergence of ‘new global
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rulers’ (Büthe and Mattli 2011; Cafaggi 2011; Mattli and Woods 2009b). Many
commentators have offered a positive account of the rise of transnational
regulatory networks as a way of transferring expertise and knowledge (Slaughter
2004) and as a challenge to the state’s monopoly over regulation; some have even
hailed the rise of a new, pluralist global world order (Matthews 1997). The focus
of these studies on expertise and efficiency has meant that the distributional
effects of globalized regulation have been left largely unaddressed (Mazower
2012).2 While there is a vibrant debate about democratic deficit in the European
Union, including a shift from input to output legitimacy (Scharpf 1999), it is
primarily concerned with public rather than private governance.
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governance in turn has been contrasted with the experimental involvement of
various stakeholders in the making and shaping of rules and regulations in
Europe outside formal processes (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). The “New
Governance” (ibid) has been hailed as an alternative to public governance as it
offers stakeholders direct and deliberative participation in problem solving.
Some of this literature is concerned with the questions we raise in this paper,
namely who sets the rules for whom, who participates in rule making that affects
others and whether those excluded from framing regulation are given an
opportunity to express their choice ex post by deliberation, rule amendment or
exit (Esty 2006; Black 2008; de Burca 2008). This literature offers rich insights
into the emergence of new governance forms outside the state and the challenges
they raise for legitimacy and accountability. Unlike the regulatory capabilities
A partial exception is analyses of the impact of global public rules. Thus, Mattli and Woods
analyze the distributional effects institutional context has on the ability of small elites to capture
most of the gains. See (Mattli and Woods 2009a).
3 See, however, (Schepel 2005).
2
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approach, however, it does not stake a normative claim of the governed to selfdetermination and does not specifically address the distributional consequences
of regulation.
The fact that transnational regulation is imbued with power and wealth effects
has equally been recognized. As Grant and Keohane (2005) have shown,
globalization has produced a range of new public, private and hybrid ‘power
wielders’. They demonstrate that these power wielders do not operate
unconstrained but face a range of accountability mechanisms, including
hierarchy, supervision, fiscal or funding constraints, market mechanisms, peer
pressure and public reputational mechanisms (ibid at 36). Their primary concern
is the potential for abuse of power. Our concern goes further, namely the denial
of the right to self-governance. From this perspective, not all accountability
mechanisms, even if effective in preventing abuse of power, are equal. Different
accountability mechanisms empower different actors and embody different
normative principles. Market mechanisms endorse economic value reflected in
the market price and reward those willing and able to pay the highest price,
whereas political mechanisms in principle give voice also to those who lack
economic power. The ‘pressure’ that comes with political voice is the poor’s last
resort for drawing attention to their plight, as research on water management in
the slums of Mumbai has demonstrated (Anand 2011). Lastly, market-based
mechanisms tend to assume a given set of preferences – utility maximization in
economic efficiency terms. Contesting a wider range of preferences and social
goals requires a public space (Habermas and Lawrence 1991).

5

This paper argues that the ability to choose regulation – the framing of a
regulatory domain and the ‘if’ and ‘how’ of its regulation – is a value in itself. This
normative position is derived from the basic principle of self-determination,
which can be further divided into two components: (collective) democratic selfgovernance and (individual) private autonomy. Democratic self-governance
empowers individuals to participate in collectively determining priorities for the
society in which they live and the means for achieving them (Schmitter and Karl
1991; de Burca 2008; Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1995). The principle of private
autonomy endorses the idea that private parties (individuals or entities) are best
positioned to determine their own preferences and to bargain over whose
preferences might prevail (Smith 1976). By the same token it denies one party the
right to unilaterally impose its preferred allocation of rights and responsibilities,
costs and rewards, on another (Watt 2010).
Neither collective self-governance nor private autonomy is ever realized in
pure form, but moderated by bargaining processes embedded with prevailing
power and wealth relations. We thus do not argue for the full and unmitigated
realization of self-determination in all regulatory domains. Instead, we seek to
draw attention to the differential effect TPR exerts on the ability of people –
groups and communities within and across states – to choose the rules that
govern them. We are particularly concerned with the possibility that TPR might
systematically entrench the regulatory powers of some at the expense of others
and impose regulatory regimes that were framed outside existing polities or with
selective participation of only a few, and with the effects this might have on
democratic self-governance. By stepping outside existing political structures
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some agents acquire a voice that reflects their economic and political power or
expertise, but is incommensurate with the democratic principle of one-citizenone-vote. TPR also challenges private autonomy if it is used to grant some private
actors the right to set the rules that others must follow absent effective bargaining
processes on which the principle of private autonomy rests.
Moreover, TPR affects domestic polities establishing regulatory standards for
sovereign states. Within the domestic realm states used to be the dominant
regulator intruding into the private autonomy of citizens and economic entities
(Majone 1994; Pildes and Sunstein 1995; Glaeser and Shleifer 2003). While state
regulation typically operates next to private self-regulation in domains as diverse
as family relations, financial trading platforms and the internet (Engle Merry
1988; Breton et al. 2009), the state has arguably been primus inter pares: it has
the power to define the scope of permissible self-regulation, albeit subject to
domestic constitutional and political constraints. With the rise of TPR, however,
states have on occasion joined the ranks of the regulated by passing and
implementing rules and standards that emanate from private regulators
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).
An example of how private agents frame regulation to be endorsed and
implemented by states is the international accounting standards devised by the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) (Büthe and Mattli 2011).
Another is the netting rules for derivatives4 developed by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA), which lobbied over fifty legislatures around
Netting rules allow the counterparties to derivatives transactions to net their reciprocal claims
outside the pool of assets used to satisfy all other creditors. They effectively sidestep the priority
rules of bankruptcy codes in privileging parties to derivatives over other creditors. See (Morgan
2008).

4
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the world to change their bankruptcy codes to make them consistent with these
netting rules. While these rules protect the complex contractual network of
derivatives contracts, they create new risk for the financial system by accelerating
downward trends (Roe 2011). As a matter of formal law sovereign states cannot
be forced to comply with these rules. Private regulatory standards or guiding
principles tend to be voluntary rather than mandatory; they are offered as models
or best practices for a given regulatory domain; the primary sanction mechanism
is the power of exclusion. In the absence of viable alternatives this, however, can
be a powerful inducement. Similarly to TPR, soft law principles have found their
way into multilateral organizations – the IMF or the World Bank – which
frequently endorse them as ‘best practice’ standards recommended to client
states requesting loans and/or policy advice. This third party enforcement has
proven to be a powerful instrument in core areas of TPR, such as finance (IMF
2003) and rules governing business (Worldbank 2008).
The regulatory capabilities approach draws attention to the impact TPR has
on the ability of individuals and collectives to determine the rules that shall
govern them. We are not oblivious to the fact that TPR has many upsides. Rule by
experts outside cumbersome political processes that are often burdened with veto
players promises efficiency gains in rule making processes and regulatory
outcomes (Slaughter 2004). If efficiency were the only, or indeed the preferred,
norm that people around the globe value, TPR might not cause much concern.
Irrespective of the process by which regulatory regimes were established, this
outcome – if indeed achievable – could be said to justify its means. If, however,
people have different preferences and values, efficiency claims alone cannot
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justify denying them an opportunity to express their own choice. Some may wish
to trade efficiency for equality, sustainability or simply the freedom to choose and
may be willing to accept the costs in reduced efficiency. We suggest that they
should have the right to do so. Recognizing the right to choose in the context of
regulation also offers an answer to democratic deficit debates: While a global
democratic polity may be difficult to achieve, the normative principles enshrined
in the idea of democratic self-governance could be advanced by embracing the
notion of regulatory capabilities and developing institutional strategies for its
realization.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II below develops the regulatory
capabilities approach; Section III discusses its inspiration, the individual
capabilities approach; Section IV delineates capabilities from capacities; Section
V analyzes how different modes of regulation affect regulatory capabilities.
Section VI addresses strategies for developing and sustaining regulatory
capabilities. Section VII concludes.

II. Regulatory Capabilities: The Basic Concept

Regulatory capabilities stands for the normative principle that individuals and
collectives should have a choice as to what rules and regulations shall govern
them. It is derived from the principle of self-determination. The principle of selfdetermination has traditionally been associated with the nation state and has
been used to afford people claiming to be part of a single nation the right to form
their own state and to choose its political order. In a world where nation states
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operate with substantial autonomy it makes sense to associate the right to selfdetermination primarily if not exclusively with statehood. In an increasingly
interdependent world where rules created outside states demand compliance by
citizens and entities within states, even by the states themselves, the concept
needs to be reframed. In such a world the primary challenge to selfdetermination emanates from the proliferation of power wielders who, in pursuit
of their own self-interest, disregard or are oblivious to others’ freedom to choose.
One concern is outright abuse of power; another is that those who control TPR
processes will diminish the scope for regulatory capabilities of people subjected
to their regimes.
The regulatory capabilities concept is meant to illuminate and assess
deficiencies and potentials of TPR as concerns the freedom to choose the rules
and regulations by which one is governed. It is has affinity with attempts to reconceptualize regulation in the domestic or regional realm by broadening input
from various constituencies in the making and implementation of regulatory
regimes as reflected, for example, in the notion of ‘responsive regulation’ (Ayres
and Braithwaite 1992) and its cousin in European affairs, ‘reflexive regulation’
(De Schutter and Lenoble 2010). The regulatory capabilities approach shares
with responsive regulation the deep commitment to democratic and republican
principles, but it does not presume that all regulation emanates from the state or
at most is delegated to non-state actors. Instead, it takes account of the fact that
in the transnational sphere regulatory regimes emerge without explicit delegation
by state actors. As such, the regulatory capabilities approach has greater affinity
to concepts of reflexive governance, or the respect for other-regarding concerns
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in rule making and rule implementation. Yet, as will become clearer below, it
places greater emphasis on creating the institutional conditions for individuals,
collectives and entities to express their preferences, choose alternative forms of
regulation or determine how best to govern interdependencies between different
regulatory regimes. Lastly, the regulatory capabilities approach as affinity with
the notion of “architecture of inclusion” as developed by Sturm (Sturm 2006).
She argues that individuals realize their capabilities in large part as members of
organizations – schools, universities, the work place, clubs and social
organizations. Building inclusive architectures for these entities is therefore a
critical step in enhancing individual capabilities. In a similar vein, we argue that
the structure of transnational regulatory regimes is critical for the regulatory
capabilities of those affected by them.
To develop the concept of regulatory capabilities, we first define the concept
of regulation, identify the mechanisms of regulation and distinguish between
regulators and the regulated. Regulation entails the standardization of a set of
rules for a given domain – such as finance, food safety or environmental
protection. Transnational regulatory domains can be established and sustained
by different institutional mechanisms that empower some and disempower
others, including public, private and hybrid ones. Purely public regimes result
from state-to-state negotiation and are subject to ratification processes that
subject them, in principle, to domestic political control. An example is the
creation of a European anti-trust regime in the European Treaty, or the
international free trade regime embodied in the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Only countries that accede to the treaty in question are formally bound
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by the regime – even though multilateral treaties often exert effects on nonsignatories as well. Importantly, the accession process is determined not by
international law alone, but in conjunction with the domestic constitutional
requirements of the ratifying country. As such, the demoi in the acceding states
exercise choice, at least in the formal sense.
On the opposite side of the spectrum are transnational regulatory regimes
devised by private actors. Private actors may have political or economic reasons
for advancing TPR as a means for achieving these goals. Prominent examples
include the creation of product standards for global trade and accounting
standards for firms (Büthe and Mattli 2011). Private TPR regimes frequently
involve national public regulators, but this does not need to be the case.5 Other
examples of private regimes are labeling and certification schemes for fair trade,
organic products or environmental sustainability, further discussed below.
Private regulators tend to establish standards for products or production
processes and use private mechanisms – contracts – as the regulatory tool and
certification for signaling actual compliance to consumers. Many of the goals
transnational regulatory regimes pursue are well taken, even laudable. Yet, from
the perspective of the regulatory capabilities approach the ends don’t justify the
means. Whatever goals private regulators might pursue, these goals may not be
shared by those subjected to the regime: e.g., in the case of global production
chains with suppliers or producers in far afield countries. Private regulation is
frequently imposed through contractual mechanisms that in form, but not
5 Note that Büthe in this issue argues that regulatory regimes require a focal point and therefore
limits his analysis to such regimes, which typically come with the endorsement of public national
regulators.
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necessarily in substance, adhere to the principle of private autonomy. At face
value they may involve an element of choice, but unequal bargaining power
leaves the suppliers and producers with a take-it-or-leave-it option. Moreover, by
imposing a single set of contracts on producers or suppliers in different countries
these regimes can trigger processes of consolidation if not concentration of
sectors in the economy as producers and suppliers seek out cost-efficient ways to
meet the imposed standards. This can have far reaching implications on the
structure of local economies and the relative bargaining power of local actors
(Cata Backer 2007; Vandenbergh 2007). Yet, the standards themselves have
never been vetted in a political process that allows for contestation and norm
competition.
In between the purely public and the purely private regimes is a range of
hybrid arrangements that combine public and private rule makers and regulators.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors (BCBS) discussed by Lall in this
issue (see also (Simmons 2001)), for example, brings together (public) regulators
from select countries – formerly the G7, now the G20 – to determine the
standards of prudential regulation for internationally active banks. Regulators
have formal jurisdiction within the territory of their nation state. Yet, the
collective of national regulators admitted to the BCBS – membership being
determined by the most powerful actors in the club 6 – effectively establishes
prudential standards for every country wishing to join global financial markets;
financial intermediaries from countries that do not comply with these standards

The decision to expand the club was made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and
announced by then President George W. Bush.
6
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face exclusion from global financial centers (Kapstein 1996). The rules and
regulations BCBS adopts have far reaching implications well beyond the national
regulators that take part in the rule making process. BCBS frames domestic
financial regulation and as such allocates the costs for regulatory failure to
different constituencies. BCBS consults with global financial intermediaries,
including the Institute for International Finance (IIF), but the customers of
financial intermediaries and taxpayers who will have to bail them out in the event
of market and/or regulatory failure are absent from this process. Critically, these
stakeholders rarely exercise much voice at the legislative or implementation
stages in their home jurisdictions either. As Lall emphasizes, the non-public
nature of the bargaining process at the BCBS rules out public contestation and
ensures that bargains struck early in the process become sticky.
TPR can also result from a single country unilaterally establishing standards
for those wishing to engage with customers on its territory. This protects the
sovereignty of the standard setting country and the voice of its citizens, but at the
expense of countries that house producers and suppliers that become rule takers,
not rule makers. The food safety standards that govern global food chains are
established by major importers, such as the United States and the European
Union, without much regard for the effects they might have on producers,
suppliers or the economic structures of exporting countries (DeSchutter 2013).
Private entities (typically corporations headquartered in importing countries)
transmit these standards to producers and suppliers by way of private contracts.
Only those willing and able to comply with these standards find buyers for their
products in international markets. This is not an argument against food safety
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standards in general, or private food safety standards in particular. It is to point
out that standards can be set and enforced in different ways. They can be more or
less attuned to local conditions in exporting countries and impose more or less
costs on producers and suppliers. In the absence of choice for suppliers and
producers, economies of scale that benefit major importers will invariably trump
these other concerns. Local or national governments, and potentially other
intermediaries, can enhance the voice of producers and suppliers if they insert
themselves in the negotiation of compliance requirements and help organize local
voice. The principles set forth by the Roundtable on Sustainable Soy, for example,
binds those participating in a supply chain to respect local agricultural practices
and engage in a dialogue with local communities about how best to preserve
them.7
In each of the above cases one can detect an element of choice. The Basel
Accord, for example, does not have direct legal effect in countries around the
world, but has to be incorporated into domestic legislation to become legally
effective. International accounting standards need to be endorsed by local
regulators to avoid the costs associated with duplication. Ex ante state delegation
as well as ex post state ratification and state validation of private contracts all
play a critical role in these regimes. But the choice is more often than not a
simple take-it-or-leave-it option. Rejecting the regime on offer implies exclusion
not only from regulatory domains but also from the markets they regulate.

See principle 3 of Roundtable for Sustainable Soy, available at www.rss.org. Last visited 20
March 2013.
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Every regulatory regime gives more voice to some than to others and as such
has distributional consequences. From the perspective of regulatory capabilities
the critical question is whether these effects are random or systemic in the sense
that they predictably deny certain constituencies their right to regulatory selfdetermination. Equally important is the openness of regulatory regimes to future
contestation. The reach of regulatory regimes changes over time and exerts
differential effects on different people, many of which may be difficult to foresee
at the outset. From the perspective developed here only regimes that are open to
correction and adaptation, i.e. those that remain contestable live up to the
normative standards of regulatory capabilities.

III. From Individual to Regulatory Capabilities

The term regulatory ‘capabilities’ is inspired by the work of Amartya Sen and
Martha Nussbaum on individual capabilities. Sen has long questioned the almost
universal acceptance of wealth creation as the primary if not exclusive goal of
economic development (Collier 2007) and has instead placed freedom at the
center of development. Wealth is a means for, but individual freedom is the end
of development (Sen 1999). Importantly, freedom cannot be assumed. Conditions
for individuals to pursue their individual freedom are human-made, or socially
constructed, and as such contingent on political choices that are embodied in law,
institutions and organizational practices. The individual capabilities approach
thus shifts the focus from the protection of negative freedoms against the state to
the conditions for individuals to choose the lives they have reason to value (Sen
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1999). From this perspective even the most negative rights – property, free
speech, religious freedom, etc. – acquire a positive connotation: they too are
contingent on social conditions.
While Sen contends himself with the broad concept of individual capabilities
and justifies its open-ended nature as a reflection of pluralism, Nussbaum has
gone a step further and developed a list of ‘central’ individual capabilities
(Nussbaum 2003). They include, among others, the ability to lead a normal life,
preserve one’s bodily integrity, engage in practical reasoning, associate and live
with others.8 These central capabilities constitute a basic normative threshold for
societies to be deemed just without identifying them with a single mode of
institutional realization (Nussbaum 2011, p. 40). Only societies that put all their
members in a position to realize these capabilities – i.e. enable them to achieve
minimum levels of education, protect them from harm and give them access to
health care, nourish institutions and organizations that foster different forms of
affiliation, among others – can be called just (Nussbaum 2011).
The capabilities approach’s focus on actual attainments has led some to argue
that it is primarily if not exclusively outcome-oriented. Yet, Sen distinguishes
between agency and well-being freedom, where the former relates to the freedom
to choose and only the latter to outcomes. 9 The argument also overlooks the

8 Nussbaum defines the relationship between practical reason and capabilities as follows: “The
opportunity to plan one’s own life is an opportunity to choose and order functionings
corresponding to the other various capabilities”. See (Nussbaum 2011, 39) .
9 In relation to agency freedom he recognizes that there is a complex relationship between choice
and freedom and that one should not give for granted that there is always a positive correlation
between the two. In fact it might very well be that a conflict between the two can arise. See (Sen
1992, 56) where he states: “Freedom is a complex notion. Facing more alternatives need not
invariably be seen as an expansion of a person’s freedom to do the things he would like to do... the
expansion of choices to be made is both an opportunity (the choices can be made by oneself) and
a burden (the choices have to be made by onself).” Ibid at 63.
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central role institutions play within the capabilities framework. Individual choice
is determined not exclusively by individual preferences or endowments, but by
the availability of capability sets as defined by institutional arrangements, both
public and private.10 Individuals’ abilities to exercise their freedoms are therefore
in large measures dependent on proactive intervention. Freedom of speech
requires command of a language as well as literacy, and by implication education;
so does the ability to participate in social and political life. The critical question
for a capabilities analysis is therefore whether individuals are put in a position to
choose the lives they value. This implies that within this framework outcome is
contingent on institutional prerequisites. These institutional prerequisites result
from collective choice.
Who then bears the obligation to enable individuals to choose? In the past the
answer to this question has been predominantly the society or state of which the
individual is a member or citizen. The nation state continues to play a critical role
in providing the preconditions for justice even in the age of globalization
(Nussbaum 2011). Still, the rise of transnational governance means that many
conditions that affect an individual’s capabilities are created outside and out of
the control of his or her domestic polity. It follows that this polity no longer bears
exclusive responsibility for social justice. That responsibility, we argue, is shared
with rule makers beyond its shores. In the case of TPR the responsibility for
individual capabilities therefore does not lie exclusively with states. Instead, the
instigators of TPR – that is, the foreign certification bodies, the global rulers for
10 In the words of Marth Nussbuam, “combined capabilities are defined as internal capabilities
plus the social/political/economic conditions in which functioning can actually be chosen…”. See
(Nussbaum 2011, 22).
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financial and accounting standards and the multinational standard transmitters
– share a responsibility. This responsibility is to the individual as well as to
organized groups that are subjected to TPR.
Even when there is widespread agreement about the goals of regulation – the
prevention of nuclear, financial or health disasters, for example – there may still
be disagreement about how best to achieve them and about the allocation of the
costs of regulation as well as those of possible regulatory failure. It may be
rational for every regulator, whether public or private, to externalize these costs
to others beyond its respective sphere of accountability. However, in an
interdependent world externalization can only be partial or temporary and can
easily escalate into a system-wide crisis. Interdependence has become the
hallmark of our age of globalization. Domestic economies are deeply integrated
with global production chains, financial markets and transport systems. Actions
and events in one part of the global system sooner or later affect other parts. The
global financial crisis has amply demonstrated that ‘de-coupling’ is possible only
for those countries that have abstained from integration with the global system
(Cetorelli and Goldberg 2011).
Lambin et al (2011) identify four different modes of interdependence:
displacement, rebound, cascading and remittance. Each is associated with effects
institutional and regulatory change can have far from where the change took
place. Specifically, displacement stands for the migration of activities from one
place to another; the rebound effect for cost reducing improvements such as
technological or institutional change that may, contrary to expectations, increase
rather than decrease harmful activities; the cascade effect for “a chain of events
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due to a perturbation affecting a system” (ibid at 3468); and the remittance effect
for the possible negative effects of resource transfers on previously unsustainable
practices in the recipient location. To address these varying effects of
interdependencies, which are difficult to anticipate ex ante, groups and
communities that will be negatively affected by them should be enabled to act
upon them. This requires local information gathering, local regulatory capacity
and the collective ability to respond to threats posed to the community.
Communities that are consistently denied and therefore lack the ability to
collectively choose the rules that shall govern them will be unable to respond to
new challenges as they arise.

IV. Regulatory Capabilities vs. Regulatory Capacity

A distinction must be drawn between the regulatory capabilities approach and
the notion of regulatory capacity, one that parallels the distinction between
individual capabilities and individual capacity. Many individuals are unable to
enhance their own wellbeing or that of others. They lack the education, training,
information or resources to do so. This may have different causes. Individuals
may choose leisure over study and may devote their attention, time and resources
accordingly. Alternatively, conditions may be absent for enabling individuals to
make such choices in the first place. If there are no schools, or girls are barred
from attending them in accordance with social norms, the end result is the same.
They will lack the capacity to successfully solve math problems. Importantly,
however, they lack this capacity not because of their own choice, but because they
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were denied the individual capability to make choices about the life they have
reason to value. Understanding the cause of the lack of capacity is critical for
designing effective remedies. It makes little sense to train teachers in math and
build new schools if prevailing social institutions prevent girls from taking math
classes (Banerjee and Duflo 2012). If, in contrast individuals are enabled to make
choices, but happen to make ‘wrong’ choices, incentive schemes or training to
help them do better can make a difference.
The same reasoning applies to the distinction between regulatory capacity and
capabilities in the realm of collective decision making for determining the rules
by which groups or communities shall be governed. Regulatory capacity depicts
the presence of the requisite skills and resources, including information
gathering and management systems (Esty 1999) for maintaining or complying
with regulatory regimes irrespective of who devised them. Many development
agencies seek to enhance the skill sets or capacities of constituencies in less
developed countries to enable them to comply with existing rules and regulatory
regimes, because of their presumed superiority or because they operate as
effective entry barriers to participating in global markets. An example of the
former is the International Monetary Fund’s Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP) in response to the East Asian financial crisis (IMF 2003; Pistor
2002). Rules and regulations from selected countries were compiled into best
practice standards that were used to assess regulatory regimes found elsewhere.
The underlying assumption was that the first set of rules was indeed superior and
that other countries would benefit from mimicking them it developing the
regulatory capacity to implement it effectively. Each country surveyed received
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recommendations and technical advice to increase its capacity to comply with
these standards. Similarly, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has
developed tool kits to train farmers in Latin America to produce flowers, fruits
and vegetables that can be exported to the United States. Compliance with these
standards is an entry condition to this important market. Finally, nongovernmental certifiers train local producers in countries around the globe in
production strategies that qualify them for certification as ‘fair trade’ or ‘organic’.
The concept of regulatory capabilities differs from regulatory capacity in that
its emphasis is less on skills or compliance with regulatory standards set by
others, but on the ability to choose among different regimes and to develop
alternatives. This requires a shift of attention from regulatory compliance to the
process of collective decision making. If choice is encouraged rather than
suppressed, local constituencies may well design sets of regulations that are both
effective and reflect local preferences. Indeed, the global financial crisis has
demonstrated that

financial

regulators that

established counter-cyclical

standards or adopted capital controls better weathered the fallout from the crisis
– which ironically originated in the very countries that had served as bestpractice standards for financial regulation (Hahm et al. 2012). Similarly,
producers might well develop alternative strategies for making food safe for
export that reflect their own priorities even as they meet the standard ultimately
set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US (De Schutter 2013).
That such an approach is feasible, at least in principle, is demonstrated by the
EU’s “New Approach” for regulatory standard setting. EU level directives specify
general regulatory standards; EU level regulatory bodies with input from national
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regulators add details on how to meet them; the implementation is ultimately left
to local actors who select specific regulatory means. This approach has been used
with varying success in different regulatory domains, including finance and food
safety.11 Specifically, in the case of food safety the implementation of EU level
standards leaves substantial discretion about the choice of instruments not only
to legislatures and regulators, but also to producers.
In the transnational context facilitating collective decision making with the
goal of enhancing regulatory choice for multiple constituencies faces particular
problems. With the exception of supra-national entities such as the EU, common
polities, entities or organizations that facilitate collective decision making are
largely absent; those subjected to or affected by regulation are often widely
dispersed and lack a common language or institutions to coordinate their
preferences and actions. In contrast, private regulators, especially those industryled, are fewer in numbers, well resourced, often well organized and tend to have
strong incentives to impose their preferred regime on different constituencies
irrespective of local preferences. They are primarily interested in regulatory
compliance and are thus willing to invest in capacity building. However, they
tend to be less interested in regulatory capabilities as this might disrupt their
quest for economies of scale a uniform standard affords them. A different case
concerns NGO-led regimes where local specificities and affected communities
often constitute, at least in theory, a significant concern.

For finance see the Lamfalussy process (2001); critically (Vander Stichele 2008). For food
safety see EU Directive 2001/95 on general product safety chapter II, esp. Arts. 3 and 4.
11
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V. Modes of Regulation and Regulatory Capabilities

Regulatory capabilities are not given but must be created or developed. At a
minimum this requires removing obstacles to choice; at a maximum anybody
directly or indirectly affected by a regulatory regime should have a say in its
design irrespective of his or her resources, political influence or location. The
latter is an ideal, not a claim that this state of the world might ever be realized.
The same reasons that make direct democracies in most contexts an aspiration
rather than a reality apply here – and arguably with even greater force given the
absence of an institutionalized global polity. Yet, while individual voice may be
impossible to realize, with the right institutional arrangements collective choice is
achievable in many instances; and where this should prove to be unattainable an
effective exit option is still superior to facing a monopoly regulator.
A single agent who controls access to a market can demand monopoly rents.
So can monopoly regulators, whether public, private or hybrid, when they
generate regulatory rents and reduce others’ freedom of choice (Keohane and
Victor 2011; Overdevest and Zeitlin 2013). Monopoly regulators deprive others of
their regulatory capabilities by demanding compliance and investment in specific
skills that ensure compliance. This leaves little room for experimenting with
alternative regulatory approaches that might better reflect the preferences and
goals of the regulated or others affected by the regime. In the extreme it can
undermine the ability of the regulated to formulate their own regulatory
preferences and develop the means or required skill sets for meeting them.
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The major argument for a single regulatory regime is that it reduces
transaction costs and that an effective standard would benefit all. 12 Even if a
single effective standard is within reach, its establishment entails switching costs
that create distributional effects. Moreover, any regulatory regime will require
adaptation over time, which raises the question who decides and whose interests
should be considered when making such decisions. Last but not least, as noted
earlier, the ability to choose is a value in itself and should not be disregarded
lightly. Regulatory monopolies that command exclusivity are therefore prima
facie suspect from the normative perspective of regulatory capabilities.
Consider the global food supply chains discussed by Olivier De Schutter in his
contribution to this issue (2013). They constitute an integrated regulatory regime
for food quality and safety from producers and suppliers to exporters, importers,
whole and retail sellers and finally consumers. The dominant regulatory tool
within the chain is contracts, anchored in public regulations of the importing
country. As detailed by De Schutter, the rise of TPR has gone hand in hand with a
remarkable consolidation in this sector, with large importers and exporters
controlling access to global markets, squeezing out small producers and
suppliers. This outcome might be regarded as the natural product of competition,
where superior organizational forms – global supply chains – weed out inferior
ones. However, survival or dominance may also result from unequal bargaining
power or greater resources that advantage some over others in dividing up the
transnational regulatory space. Once established, the first mover advantage
12 The

superiority of a hierarchical single regime has been recently challenged by recognizing the
potential benefits of complex regimes. See (Keohane and Victor 2011) and (Sabel and Simon
2012).
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associated with standard setting generates increasing returns, which makes
future change difficult if not impossible irrespective of the standard’s quality (Lall
2013).
Another example of regulatory monopolies is the standards for “good
manufacturing practices” and “good clinical practices” for pharmaceuticals
promulgated by the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) (Berman
2013). Public regulators and private companies from three polities – the US, the
EU and Japan – have joined force and created common regulatory standards in
an attempt to facilitate trade and minimize entry barriers. Representatives from
other countries can be granted observer status but have no actual say in the
standard setting exercise. ICH standards have effectively become global
standards; producers wishing to export to markets represented by ICH must
comply. This is costly and many producers have been unable to do so. The
introduction of ICH standards in China, India, Romania and other emerging
markets has resulted in the closure of many smaller producers of
pharmaceuticals (ibid). If these standards were the only viable option to ensure
the safety of pharmaceuticals, this outcome would be inevitable. However, it is at
least feasible that other standards ensure safety and are less costly for potential
competitors. ICH’s regulatory oligopoly restricts access to markets; it also
restricts alternative regulatory options and thus impedes regulatory capabilities
in the countries affected by it, i.e. all that house pharmaceutical companies that
wish to access markets in the US, EU and Japan.
Market control is just one path to regulatory monopoly. Another is the network
effect: An individual or entity may opt into a regulatory regime to benefit from
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the fact that many others have done so already. Here too, others have made
regulatory choices; the difference is that the decision to join is based on interest
alignment rather than conflict. Still, closer scrutiny suggests that in many
instances network effects are indistinguishable from classic monopolies; the
outcome may even be worse because the costs of leaving a network may preclude
change even if the majority of network members so desires. Examples of
regulatory network effects are regional payment systems, which must be
interoperable for payers, intermediaries and final recipients. The adoption of
common standards within the European Union was fraught with tension as
industries in different countries had established different standards and were
expected to lose if standards with “winner takes all” qualities (David and
Greenstein 1990) were chosen. In the European context there was substantial
deliberation and stakeholder involvement. However, the global wholesale
payment system, which was established by the leading central banks in
consultation with their domestic financial industry, but not with regulators or
regulated in other countries that sought access to the system (DeRosa 2013).
Other TPR regimes display varying degrees of choice. Auld et al (2013)
distinguish between control and empowerment regimes: the former are
characterized by strict guidelines that are centrally monitored and enforced, the
latter by more decentralized, even reciprocal relations of monitoring and learning
(Sabel 1995). Labeling regimes for fair trade and certification for organic
production provide interesting material for comparing the evolution of regimes
and their effect on regulatory capabilities over time. The Fair Labeling
Organization (FLO) began as an in-house process for assessing production
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conditions and offering consultations for improvement. Over time it was
increasingly centralized, first with the creation of an in-house independent
committee followed by the establishment of a separate entity in charge of
monitoring compliance and ensuring consistency. The major driver for this
change, according to Auld et al., was the threat of legal liability from market
actors. They challenged the denial of a fair trade label to them on the grounds
that small producers in developing countries obtained them because different
standards were applied to them and that this constituted unfair, discriminatory
treatment. Leaving aside whether the legal challenge would have been successful,
the FLO exhibited strong litigation-risk aversion, with negative distributional
effects for those unable to meet the new uniform standards. Certification
programs for organic produce evolved in a similar fashion (Auld, Renckens, and
Cashore 2013; Arcuri 2013). At the outset, organic producers around the world
created the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements
(IFOAM) to facilitate sharing of information about organic production and
cultivation processes among its members. Monitoring was originally devised as a
two-way process that involved advice and technical assistance for improvements
consistent with diverse local conditions. Over time, the process became
increasingly formalized, and the accreditation and certification programs have
now been institutionalized as the International Organic Accreditation Service
(2006). Arcuri (2013) argues in this issue that the evolution from a federation
targeted at producers into a global accreditation system has gone hand in hand
with the ‘publicization’ of private regulatory regimes, i.e. their incorporation into
public law. In a parallel development, organic farming became industrialized, and
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these processes jointly resulted in a weakening of organic standards (ibid). The
original movements’ founders, the small-scale farmers, were increasingly
marginalized in this process as bigger actors assumed an active role in the
formulation of standards and the lobbying of legislatures. These two examples do
not add up to proof that attempts to design regulatory regimes with a goal of
enhancing regulatory capabilities will be pushed aside by competition or lobbying
to give way to more centralized structures. But they do suggest that for regimes
that endorse regulatory capabilities to survive, more is needed than good
intentions at the outset.

VI. Developing and Sustaining Regulatory Capabilities

The foregoing analysis raises the question how best to develop and sustain
regulatory capabilities in the transnational setting. The analysis that follows is
necessarily abstract as we lack systematic data about regulatory capabilities
enhancing regimes and their evolution over time. Nonetheless, some important
inferences can be drawn from contributions to this special issue, other case
studies and related literatures that grapple with modes of governance beyond
states and markets (Ostrom 2010; Powell 1990; de Burca 2008).
Our concern is with the initial design of regulatory regimes that enhance
regulatory capabilities and their sustainability. The concept of self-determination
as used in this paper is not limited to an initial decision to create a regime, but
extends to the continuing contestability of the regime by those affected by it.
Participating in the initial design of the regime creates a presumption of choice,
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but no more. Regimes that evolve to restrict regulatory capabilities to only the
regulators or deny some critical constituencies voice and/or exit rebut that
presumption. The main beneficiaries of regulatory capabilities may change over
time as some gain and others lose access to rule setting. Yet, as Nussbaum has
pointed out, only a society that enables all its members to develop their
individual capabilities (see supra) is a just society. In a similar vein, only a just
regulatory regime must promote regulatory capabilities for all. At a minimum,
regulatory regimes that deny regulatory capabilities systematically to certain
constituencies must be deemed unjust.
With these principles in mind we turn to the question of how to develop and
sustain regulatory capabilities. The analysis in the previous section suggests first,
that monopoly regulation is prima facie objectionable from a regulatory
capabilities approach; and second, that regulatory approaches that enhance
regulatory capabilities are possible, but often fragile. It follows that enabling
conditions are needed not only for establishing regulatory regimes conducive to
regulatory capabilities, but also for sustaining them over time.
The case studies on fair trade and organic production by Auld et al. and Arcuri
suggest that regulatory capabilities enhancing regimes can arise spontaneously.
This is possible when similarly situated actors create member-based regulatory
regimes that bring together regulators and regulated to achieve a common goal,
such as fair trade or organic agricultural practices. Importantly, such regimes
have been created among geographically dispersed actors with very different
capacities in achieving the common goal. The insights from these case studies are
supported by research on polycentric governance regimes (Ostrom 2010).

30

Extensive case studies and lab results suggest that collective governance “beyond
states and markets” is feasible when actors can communicate with one another,
rely on reputational bonds, have viable exit options yet share a longer-term
horizon, have high marginal capital return and agree on sanctions (ibid).
This analysis helps explain why the regulatory capabilities enhancing original
regimes were not sustained over time. The initial organization of these regimes
was based on commonality of goals; it facilitated communication among
participants and provided for sanctioning regimes as well as exit options.
However, competition in product markets shortened the time horizon and eroded
cooperation. Moreover, differential access to public law makers (in the case of
organic food production in the US) allowed some to promote alternative goals
that exhibited larger economies of scale for themselves and prompted them to
defect.
At a more general level this raises the question whether competition is
compatible with regulatory capabilities: Where the market principle determines
winners or losers, few actors have incentives to invest in capabilities of their
potential competitors. Even if they might benefit from this in the long term – as
suggested by the literature on contracting for innovation (Gilson, Sabel, and Scott
2009),

and

also

the

discussion

supra

about

the

need

to

address

interdependencies – competition tends to shorten the time horizon for costbenefit analyses and creates incentives for defecting in search of short-term
gains.
Still, extensive cooperation is feasible under conditions of competition if
mediated by a quasi-neutral agent. In his analysis of networks as social

31

organizations between hierarchy and markets, Woody Powell argues that such an
“anchor tenant” should have a vested interest in the common goal 13 without
standing in direct competition to other participants in the network (Powell 1990;
Powell 2010). The major function of this anchor tenant is to keep all eyes on the
common goal and mediate conflicts between relevant parties, whose willingness
to participate in the mediation clearly depends on their expected gains from
collaboration. The anchor tenant has an interest in mediating competing
objectives of other participants to ensure a positive outcome. The other
participants will yield if and when their expected returns of staying in the regime
exceed the costs of exit, which exclude not only the actual costs of leaving a
regime, but also of being excluded from and the need to create an alternative one.
Such an anchor tenant may be the government of a nation state that brings
together local producers, exporters and foreign importers as in the case of South
Africa’s intervention in global food production chains (see De Schutter in this
issue), or a multi-lateral institution such as the World Bank or a regional
development bank. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD), for example, played a critical role in mediating the management of the
financial crisis for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. It convened
regulators, supervisors and finance ministers from home and host countries of
banks in the region to prevent a financial collapse. With only minimal principles
of conduct – a commitment not to withdraw capital in an uncoordinated fashion
and the right to be heard – and a commitment to make public the commitments
made, it was able to achieve cooperation in a situation where most of the larger
13

This is why it is a quasi-neutral, not entirely neutral agent.
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players had strong incentives to defect (Pistor 2011). While it is too early to assess
the longer term sustainability of this particular regime (EBRD 2011), the ‘Vienna
Initiative’ demonstrates that multilateral organizations can play a critical role in
inducing cooperative behavior and other-regarding preferences -- a first step
towards enhancing regulatory capabilities. This analysis also draws attention to
the fact that the internal architecture (Sturm 2006) of international organizations
and other entities is crucial for their role as effective anchor tenant. In particular,
the EBRD drew strength from its role as a fairly small actor with extensive ties to
both the private and public sector and a reputation of acting as a neutral arbiter
(Pistor 2011).
A mediating agent or anchor tenant might also play an important role where
regulatory

capabilities

enhancing

regimes

face

defection

or

creeping

monopolization by mediating disputes and developing compromise solutions,
such as conditional or temporal exemptions from regulatory standards. It might
also help organize constituencies to contest a defector’s attempt to gain
competitive advantages by lobbying for state backing of his monopoly regime.
This raises interesting questions as to the design characteristics of such an
agent, a question that can be answered in the abstract but depends on the nature
of the regime, its scope and the identity of the regulators, the regulated, other
beneficiaries and potential victims of the regime. This will have to be left to future
research. By highlighting the potential of mediating agents to promote regulatory
capabilities enhancing regimes we hope to show that regulatory selfdetermination does not necessarily require a fully integrated polity. Instead,
domain specific mediators may be a promising solution.
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VII.

Concluding Comments

The regulatory capabilities approach calls attention to the fact that regulation
entails distributional effects not only in terms of power and wealth but also with
regard to the right to self-determination for individuals and communities. There
is more than one way to regulate most issues, and some strategies offer greater
freedom to choose for more constituencies than others. This may increase the
transaction costs of regulation, but costs alone should not justify the curtailment
of the right to self-determination, which is a fundamental expression of freedom.
This paper has argued that the collective right to self-determination should not
be confined to nations or statehood. In an increasingly interdependent world
where multiple actors assume regulatory powers over others, self-determination
must be redefined as the right to choose the rules by which one is governed and
must ensure the respect of others’ choices in more general terms. We are only
seeing the beginnings of attempts to institutionalize this principle and it is too
early to say whether these experiments will be successful in the long term. The
goal of this paper was not to demonstrate that this would be an easy task, but
instead to put regulatory capabilities as a normative principle at the center of the
debate about transnational regulation, in particular TPR.
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